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Abstract To determine whether fish welfare matters morally, we need to know
what characteristics or capacities beings need to have in order to be morally con-
siderable, and whether fish have such characteristics. In this paper I discuss a group
of theories, Kantian practical reasoning theories, in which agency (or practical
rationality) is traditionally thought to be a necessary condition for moral consi-
derability. An individual must have quite sophisticated capacities to be a (moral)
agent in such theories: she must be able to act on rational principles. It seems
unlikely that nonhuman animals such as fish have such capacities. I argue, however,
that on the basis of certain Kantian arguments, moral agents have reason to accept
duties to nonrational animals if they are agents in a much less demanding sense: if
they are motivated to pursue the objects of their desires. If fish have this capacity,
their welfare matters morally.
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Introduction
Does fish welfare matter morally? To answer this question, we have to determine
what characteristics or capacities beings need to have in order to be morally
considerable, and whether fish have such characteristics. Different proposals have
been made for characteristics that are necessary conditions for moral considera-
bility, for example being alive, being sentient (that is, being able to feel pain and
pleasure), or being an agent (a practically rational being). If life is the ticket to
mattering morally, then fish are in, but so are plants or even bacteria. In the well-
known moral theory of utilitarianism, animals who can feel pain and pleasure stand
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out from the rest of living beings. If fish have these capacities then their welfare is to
be considered equally in this theory (see e.g., Singer 1999). But in Kantian practical
reasoning theories,1 it is usually thought that only agents, that is, practically
rational beings, matter morally. This at first sight seems to be bad news for fish.
There are important differences between utilitarianism and Kantian practical
reasoning approaches. In utilitarianism, the right thing to do is regarded as that
which maximizes the good: the collective welfare of everyone. Duties not to harm
animals and to further animal welfare follow naturally from the basic premises of
this theory. In Kantian theory, however, moral actions are not regarded as means to
bring about a maximally good state of affairs. Kantian theorists try to show that a
certain moral principle (from which other duties can be derived) is founded in
practical reason, so that all rational beings have to accept this principle. In Kantian
theory, certain actions2 can be wrong in themselves, even if they produce more
welfare than another possible action. It is sometimes seen as an advantage of
Kantian theory that it can account for the widely shared intuition that it can be
wrong to, for example, sacrifice individuals or minorities, even if this maximizes the
welfare of everyone taken together.
Traditionally it has been thought that, in Kantian theory, the group of beings who
are moral agents and the group of beings who are morally considerable is
coextensive. Moral agents must have specific capacities: they must be able to act on
principles that are grounded in practical reason. If only moral agents can have moral
status, this would mean that nonhuman animals and certain intellectually disabled
human beings and infants are not morally considerable.3 There may be discussion
about relatively cognitively complex nonhuman animals like apes, but it seems
difficult to believe that fish can be practically rational.
But is it really the case that we can only have duties to practically rational beings
in Kantian theory? In this paper I will try to offer some insight into the Kantian view
of the nature and justification of morality.4 My central aim is to argue for a specific
claim. I will argue that even though, in these theories, to be a moral agent (and
1 I have borrowed this term from Darwall et al. (1992), and use it to refer to theories who attempt to give
an ultimate justification for categorical duties, by showing that these are grounded in practical reason.
There is a lot of debate about how Kant’s own moral philosophy should be interpreted. Kant in the third
chapter of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1998 [1785]) seems to attempt to give
such a fundamental justification of the Categorical Imperative. Some hold that he continued to regard this
justification as succesful in his later work Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1997 [1788]; e.g., Pauline
Kleingeld in Reath and Timmermann 2010:55–72), but others think Kant in the later work admitted such
a fundamental justification of the moral law is impossible (e.g., Jens Timmerman in Reath and
Timmermann 2010:73–89). Modern Kantian practical reasoning theorists offer an interpretation of Kant’s
justification or their own fundamental justification of categorical duties; examples are e.g., Nagel (1978),
Korsgaard (1996), and Gewirth (1978). See ‘‘Determining to whom we have moral duties’’ section and
note 6 for very brief descriptions of these arguments.
2 To be more precise: principles upon which one acts (in Kant’s own terminology: ‘‘maxims’’), which
contain not only a description of the action one performs, but also the reason why one performs the action
(e.g.: ‘‘I will lie whenever this is to my best advantage’’).
3 In the sense that we do not have direct duties to them (see ‘‘Indirect and direct duties’’ section for an
explanation of the distinction between direct and indirect duties).
4 Kantian theories are notoriously difficult, and in this paper I will not be able to do justice to the intricate
argumentation of different Kantian authors. In my PhD thesis ‘‘Agents and animals: the possibility of
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therefore morally responsible) a being has to be practically rational, certain Kantian
arguments can be used to defend the claim that to be morally considerable (so that
moral agents have duties to you), a being has to be an agent in a much less
demanding sense. It is sufficient for moral considerability that a being can
purposefully pursue the objects of desires (such as a desire not to feel pain). Note
that this is a controversial claim, which is at odds with traditional Kantian views,
although the contemporary Kantian philosopher Christine Korsgaard has recently
defended a similar claim (in e.g., Korsgaard 2005, 2011). Of course, in this paper I
can only offer a sketch of my argument, but if this argument is valid, then we have
duties to fish if they have such capacities.
Kantian Practical Reasoning Theories and Categorical Rational Requirements
Kantian practical reasoning theorists share a specific view of the nature of moral
duty and how moral duties can be justified. They regard moral requirements as
categorical requirements that are founded in practical reason. Let me explain both
of these terms in turn.
I will begin with the latter term: ‘‘practical reason.’’ We can distinguish practical
uses of our rational capacities from theoretical uses. We for instance use reason for
theoretical purposes when we attempt to gain knowledge of how things are (as in
empirical science) or when we do mathematics or formal logic. The practical use of
our rational capacities, in contrast, is the use of reason in action. It is about
determining what we should do. An example is instrumental reasoning. If you have
the purpose of getting fresh air, and the only way to get fresh air is to open a
window, it is rational to open a window and would be irrational to close it. So
instrumental reasoning concerns taking the necessary means to your end (or giving
up your end).
Sometimes people use the term ‘‘rational action’’ for action that will further your
self-interest. A rational requirement to do what will further your self-interest is
called a ‘‘prudential requirement.’’ So-called Hobbesian practical reasoning theories
(Darwall et al. 1992:131–134), named after Thomas Hobbes, a 17th century social
contract theorist, argue that it is ultimately in all of our interest to accept certain
social rules even if it may not be in our immediate interest to adhere to these rules.
For instance, in a given situation it may be in my immediate interest to lie, but if
everyone did this all the time, trust would break down, and this would not be in my
self-interest. So in this sense it may be thought to be rational for all of us to accept
certain rules, such as a rule of telling the truth.
These Hobbesian theorists seem to provide a plausible story about how certain
social or moral rules historically came into existence. But they cannot capture an
important element of common thought about morality. It is commonly thought that
morality and self-interested behavior are two very different things, and that it even
Footnote 4 continued
justifying duties to animals in Kantian practical reasoning theories’’ (preliminary title; forthcoming 2012)
I analyze these arguments in much more detail.
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detracts from the moral worth of your action if you ultimately do it because it is in
your interest, rather than because it is the right thing to do. It may for example be in
the interest of the powerful to enslave the weak, yet we would still consider this to
be morally wrong. Kantian practical reasoning theorists follow Kant in emphasizing
the concept of duty, and regarding our moral duty as independent of what is in our
interest. We should do our duty simply because it is our duty, and not (directly or
indirectly) for the sake of some self-serving end.
To understand the concept of a categorical requirement, it is useful to contrast
this with the instrumental and prudential rational requirements mentioned above.
All these requirements are supposed to be valid for all rational beings, (they are
‘‘universal’’), but there is an important difference. Instrumental requirements have
the form: ‘‘if you want to achieve some end y, and x is the necessary means to y, do
x.’’ Prudential requirements similarly say: ‘‘if y is in your interest, do y.’’ Categorical
requirements, in contrast, do not contain such an if, they are not only valid when a
specific condition holds: that acting in the way prescribed will further some
(nonmoral) end we desire to achieve or our happiness. They simply say: ‘‘do y,’’
where y stands for a moral duty. Kantian theorists attempt to show that there are
categorical requirements that all moral agents (who are in the relevant circum-
stances) must rationally accept.
At first glance, it would appear that it is more probable that we can justify moral
duties to animals in Kantian theories than in Hobbesian theories. After all, it is not
in our self-interest to accept moral constraints in our interactions with animals (the
same thing, by the way, goes for our treatment of physically or intellectually
handicapped human beings). If there are no moral constraints in our treatment of
animals, we can simply eat them, use them in scientific experiments, etc., without
qualms, and people clearly have an interest or desire in doing such things. In
Kantian theory our moral duties are not justified on the basis of our self-interest, and
this seems to leave a possibility open for duties to animals. But can Kantian
arguments for duties to others only support duties to rational beings, or also duties to
animals?
To What Kind of Beings do we have Moral Duties?
Moral Agency and the Justification of Duties
Kantian practical reasoning theorists attempt to give a fundamental rational
justification of a moral principle. The arguments generally start from a certain
conception that, these theorists argue, moral agents must have of themselves, such
as ‘‘I am a (free/rational) agent.’’ It is then argued that this self-conception rationally
commits them to a certain basic categorical requirement. All moral duties can be
derived from this basic requirement.5




It is usually thought that we, on the basis of these arguments, are only required to
accept duties to beings who are also practically rational. Moral agents, in Kantian
theory, must have specific, quite sophisticated, capacities. Animals are sometimes
said to be capable of moral behavior, for instance when they engage in seemingly
altruistic behavior. But this is not enough to count as moral agency in Kantian theory.
The idea is that natural dispositions we have, such as sympathy for others, may explain
or describe what we do, but cannot give us a justification for what we morally ought to
do. According to these Kantian theorists, we, as practically rational beings, have
moral duties because we rationally have to accept certain duties. This is the central
idea of autonomy, which is not simply understood as simply doing what one (perhaps
after reflection, and sufficiently informed) wants, but as self-legislation of moral duty.
Moral agents, then, must at least be capable of not simply acting on the strongest
desire of the moment. They must be able to act on rational requirements, even if
they lack an (unmotivated) desire to do what the requirement tells them to do. Note
that such capacities are also necessary to be able to act on the instrumental or
prudential requirements I mentioned above. At any given time I may prefer eating
cookies to exercising. To be able to act prudentially rationally, I have to be able to
suppress my stronger desire and act on a judgment about what is best for me. But
when we act on these requirements we eventually still act for the sake of some end
that is connected to our sensuous nature: to our feelings and desires, which are
related to our physical and psychological needs.
However, as explained above, when we act on a categorical requirement, we act
in a way that is rationally required regardless of what our own desires might be or
what is in our self-interest. We must be able to do our duty simply because it is the
right thing to do. It seems unlikely that nonhuman animals, especially relatively
cognitively simple animals like fish, have the abilities that are required to be able to
do this. It is often assumed that animals act on the strongest desire of the moment,
although this seems to be an overly simplistic way of thinking about animal
behavior. Although certain animals may be capable of an informal kind of
instrumental reasoning (Bermudez 2007:130), it seems implausible to assume that
they can act on the basis of insight into the validity of a formal rational principle,
such as a hypothetical or categorical requirement. Such insight seems to require the
possession of a (somewhat complex form of) language (Bermudez 2007:131).
Indirect and Direct Duties
As I mentioned above, the received view is that Kantian arguments can only support
duties to rational beings. Even if this is the case, this does not necessarily mean that
we can just treat nonhuman animals such as fish any way we please. Kant himself
has argued that we should not treat animals cruelly because this gradually ‘‘uproots
a natural predisposition [sympathy] that is very serviceable to morality in one’s
relations to other men,’’ by which he means rational beings (Kant 2000
[1797]:192–193, 6:443). But why exactly would our moral duties ultimately be
concerned with how we treat rational beings?
In this paper I am interested in the question whether we can have duties to
animals, that is, direct duties, not just duties regarding animals: duties of which
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animals are the beneficiaries, but which are ultimately duties to rational beings. I
will interpret a ‘‘duty to others’’ as a duty we have to treat them in a certain way
which is not just a means to fulfilling our duty, but is in itself a duty. For instance,
we may have a moral duty to preserve a Van Gogh painting. What makes this an
indirect duty is that the reason why we have this duty ultimately refers, say, to a
presumed interest of contemporary and future human beings to be able to
aesthetically appreciate this painting. If these human beings dropped out of the
picture, then we would have no duty whatsoever with regard to this painting.
However, if we have a direct duty to animals, to, say, not unnecessarily harm them,
it is in itself wrong to harm animals, and not, for example because it may lead us to
be cruel to other rational beings. If other rational beings dropped out of the picture,
we would still have the duty to treat animals in this way. We could perhaps say that
if we have a direct duty to animals, this means that treating animals in such a way is
a moral end in itself, and not only a means to another moral end (treating rational
beings in a certain way).
Determining to Whom we Have Moral Duties
As I mentioned above, Kantian arguments that attempt to give a fundamental
justification for moral duties to others start with a certain conception that we, moral
agents, have of ourselves and derive moral duties from this conception. Different
Kantian authors have suggested different conceptions and what implications can be
derived from this.6 Kant himself argues that all rational agents have to regard
themselves as free: as undetermined by their natural desires, and capable of acting
on a law that is constitutive of their rational will as such. This law, he argues, is the
moral law: ‘‘act in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it become a universal law’’ (Kant 1998:31; 4:421).7
I here do not have the space to discuss the difficult question of how this principle
is justified exactly,8 but to understand the general idea of the universalizability test,
6 E.g., Thomas Nagel argues that to avoid a kind of solipsism, we have to understand ourselves as
‘‘merely a person among others equally real’’ and argued that therefore all genuine reasons for action are
objective or agent-neutral: they may not contain a ‘‘free agent variable,’’ referring exclusively to the agent
who acts, such as: ‘‘I will avoid harm to myself.’’ Instead they must e.g., have the form ‘‘I will avoid harm
to anyone’’ (Nagel 1978); Christine Korsgaard offered an influential interpretation of Kant’s Formula of
Humanity, and argued that beings who understand themselves as acting rationally necessarily confer
value on rational choice (or ‘‘humanity’’) (in e.g., Korsgaard 1996). She has more recently also argued
that we must also confer value on the natural good of animals (see e.g., Korsgaard 2005, 2005, 2011);
Alan Gewirth argues that every agent has to claim rights to the goods that are instrumentally necessary for
the successful pursuit of purposes in general: freedom and well-being. As we claim these rights merely
because we are agents, we have to regard being an agent as a sufficient basis for having such rights, and
therefore also have to attribute rights to the generic goods of agency to other agents.
7 In the text that follows I use Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) as an example to make my point.
I do this because I think Kant’s FUL may be more familiar to readers than the arguments by e.g., Nagel,
Korsgaard, and Gewirth. However, I think the same basic argument can be made with regard to the
arguments of these contemporary authors, and I will here and there in footnotes refer to them.
8 In this paper, I do not address the difficult question of whether these Kantian arguments are valid. I only




it may be helpful to remember that, for Kant, morality may not be subordinated to,
or made a function of, self-interest. Moral duties are duties for all rational beings,
and the central idea is that we do not make an ‘‘exception […] for ourselves’’ (Kant
1998:34; 4:424). The principle of not helping others in need when one does not feel
like it, for instance, is something we cannot will as a universal law. If I will my
principle as a universal law, this would mean that I will a situation in which all
practically rational beings refrain from helping others in need, which would mean
that they would also not help me if I needed help. As there may very well be
moments when I want and need the help of others, I cannot will this. Therefore I
have to regard this maxim as morally impermissible, and have to accept the opposite
maxim: helping others in need.
Some authors do not regard this way of understanding the moral test as
satisfactory, as it makes the specific moral duties we have dependent on what we
happen to will or desire. (Note that the general principle, the Formula of Universal
Law, still applies to all rational beings and is as such unconditionally necessary).
Someone could in principle, it seems, accept that she never be helped in need
herself, if this means she does not have to help others in need either. These authors
have attempted to make a stronger claim.9 As I mentioned above, the principle of
instrumental reason says: if you want to achieve some end, you have to take the
necessary means to this end. These authors have pointed out that whatever ends we
want to fulfill, we need certain goods to be able to do so: e.g., our freedom, our life,
a certain amount of well-being. Regardless of what ends I want to fulfill, I cannot
rationally will a situation in which I do not have these goods. Therefore no rational
agent can accept a principle of harming others or never helping others in need,
unless she is prepared to give up the pursuit of ends altogether.
Above I described the principles the agent has in quite general terms, say of not
helping or harming others because one feels like it. But who exactly are these others?
Does the category of beings to whom we have these duties include only practically
rational beings (agents), or perhaps a subset of rational beings, or nonrational animals
too?10 The problem of the description of the principles that underlie our actions is a
familiar one in Kantian theory. I can think of all sorts of clever ways to describe my
principle to avoid it backfiring on me when I universalize it. For example, I cannot
will a principle of not harming others because this is in my self-interest as a universal
law, but I can will a principle of harming only beings with a different skin color than
myself as a universal law. The test requires us to universalize our principles, which
9 Barbara Herman makes an argument like this in the context of the Formula of Universal Law (Herman
1993:52–62) and Alan Gewirth makes a very similar argument, that is not dependent on the validity of
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (see foot note 6).
10 It may be thought that, at least in Kant’s own theory, this issue is settled by the Formula of Humanity
(FH): we have to use ‘‘humanity’’ (rational nature) as in both ourselves and other beings as an end in
itself. My question, though, is precisely why we have to accept duties to only practically rational beings.
The justification of the FH has been interpreted in different ways. In my PhD thesis (see foot note 4), I
argue that certain arguments in support of the FH, which regard our ‘‘humanity’’ as associated with our
moral autonomy, suffer from fundamental problems. Korsgaard has offered an influential interpretation of
the argument for the FH and associates humanity with ‘‘setting ends’’ in general, including nonmoral
ends. She now also uses this argument to support duties to nonrational animals (see foot note 6), and her
argument is in line with the basic argument I present in this paper.
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means willing that other rational agents act on this maxim too, but that does not yet
settle whom exactly we have duties to.
It is important to note, though, that this is not a prudential argument, although it
in certain ways looks like one. While the argument does refer to what we must
rationally accept, given that we have certain ends (e.g., that we want to avoid
suffering) or given that we pursue any ends at all, the idea is not, as in Hobbesian
practical reasoning theories mentioned above, that we accept certain rules because
they are in our mutual self-interest. As I remarked above, it is about not making an
exception for yourself. My universalizing my maxim does not make it the case that
everyone will act as I am acting: it is just a thought experiment to determine what
categorical requirements moral agents who are not merely rational, but also have
ends connected to their sensuous nature, have to accept. We can describe our
principle in a way that will allow ourselves to get off the hook when the principle is
universalized, but the question is whether we are then still accurately portraying
what our underlying principle is, or just manipulating it in a certain way to suit our
self-interest. We should not include details in our principles that do not play an
actual role in our motivation.
So can we determine in a non-arbitrary way to whom we have moral duties? Say
that you claim that the principle that underlies your action of harming someone, is
‘‘I will harm people who have a different skin color than I have, when this in my
self-interest.’’ You can, strictly speaking, universalize this principle. But then we
can ask you what would happen if you turned out to have ancestors with this skin
color. And then you have to realize you would have to regard it as impermissible for
others to harm you, because you would not want to be treated like this, or because
you cannot rationally will to be treated like this, since you cannot regard it as
permissible that you are deprived the generic means for any of your ends.11 Having
a certain skin color plays no role whatsoever in the reason why you regard it as
impermissible for others to treat you in a certain way. As long as you want to fulfill
certain purposes you would still regard this as impermissible.
Can we also use this kind of argument to support duties to nonrational animals?
Only rational beings have to accept certain moral principles. The question, however,
is what moral principles they exactly have to accept. We can ask you: what if you
were to lose your rational capacities at some point in future, would you accept that it
was permissible for us to harm you then? (see also Korsgaard 2005:104; Werner
2003:68–76). Again, the point of this thought experiment is not to show that it is not
in your interest to accept a moral rule that harming nonrational beings is allowed
because you might lose your capacity of reason. Rather, the idea is of making us
attentive to the reason why we regard certain treatment of ourselves as morally
11 This strategy of showing that arbitrary limitations of the scope of our moral duties are unjustified is
used by different Kantian authors, but most explicitly by Gewirth, in his ‘‘Argument from the Sufficiency
of Agency’’ (1978:110). You have to accept that as long as you are an agent, even if you do not have
certain special characteristics (such as being exceptionally intelligent or being called ‘‘[insert your own
name here]),’’ you would claim the generic rights, because you would need the generic goods for your
successful pursuit of purposes in general. Therefore, we must regard being an agent as a sufficient
condition of having the generic rights. In my PhD thesis (see foot note 4) I argue that, if Gewirth’s
argument is generally successful, we are rationally required to claim the rights ultimately because we
want to fulfill our purposes, which is a characteristic we share with certain nonhuman animals.
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problematic. This is not because we are rational, but because we are beings who
e.g., do not want to suffer or want to achieve nonmoral ends in general.
Nonrational animals themselves, of course, only avoid those things they are
averse to and pursue things they desire, they do not connect any moral conclusions
to this. We, rational animals, (these authors argue) do necessarily have to accept
certain moral duties when we pursue nonmoral ends. These thought experiments
show us that we must regard e.g., making beings suffer or harming them as in itself
morally wrong, regardless of whether we or anyone else is the one suffering.12 We
cannot make any arbitrary limitations with regard to who has moral status in our
personal favour. We must regard it as wrong to harm anyone who can be harmed in
the relevant respect: who can for instance suffer (an end we wish to avoid), or who
requires certain generic goods to be able to successfully pursue any ends.
The Relevance of (Moral) Agency
Above I argued that, while only moral agents have to accept certain moral
principles, we do not have to accept certain moral principles simply because we are
moral, rational agents. Note that the universalizability test is not about what we can
morally will or accept as a universal law. This would make the test viciously
circular, as it is supposed to show us exactly what principles are morally acceptable,
or what moral ends we must adopt (see also Werner 2003:104). Instead, we cannot
will a universalized principle of harming others whenever this is in one’s self-
interest because we simply do not want to be harmed ourselves, or because we have
any other nonmoral ends. Such ends are ends we desire and actively set out to fulfill,
and could range from ‘‘I do not want to suffer severe pain’’ to ‘‘I want to become a
moral philosopher.’’ We cannot will principles that, when universalized, interfere
with our being able to fulfil any such ends. Even if we turned out to lack (or knew
we were about to lose) a certain specific characteristic (a certain skin color; the
capacity of reason), but would have certain nonmoral ends, we would still regard
such treatment of ourselves as wrong. Therefore we have to accept that interfering
with the nonmoral ends of beings, whoever they are, for the sake of one’s self-
interest, is morally problematic as such.
However, it may be thought that animals cannot pursue nonmoral ends in the
same way that rational beings can, and that this is morally significant. Animals are
not only not moral agents, they are not agents at all, in the sense we normally use
this term. They cannot control their actions in the same way that we can, but seem to
act on their strongest desires. We can, for example, choose to exercise because it is
the best thing for us, even though we would much rather eat cookies. But as I
pointed out above, when we act on instrumental or prudential requirements, the ends
12 Barbara Herman argues that her argument (see foot note 9) cannot support duties to animals because
animals cannot be part of a community of mutual aid: we cannot count on them to help us in need
(Herman 1993:62). It is unclear why their being able to help us would be morally relevant. As we cannot
universalize a principle of never helping others in need, we have to accept that such a principle is morally
unacceptable, and accept the opposite principle of at least sometimes helping others in need. As I argue in
this paper, it is not about what principles are in our self-interest, but about what principles we must
consider to be morally wrong in themselves.
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we set are ultimately connected to our sensuous nature. ‘‘Rational’’ desires we have,
such as the desire to exercise, ultimately make sense in the light of other desires that
we have, such as not wanting to get ill and suffer; or any other desires we can only
satisfy if we have our health. Such ends are not prescribed by reason but connected
to our physical and psychological needs. Although there is a difference in how
rational beings and nonrational animals go about pursuing nonmoral ends, what
ultimately motivates them is similar.
I am not claiming that differences in the way human beings and animals pursue
ends are morally irrelevant, though. For instance, when an adult human being
smokes, we must assume she knows what she is doing and judges the benefits of
smoking to be worth the health risks involved. If we do not assume this, we may
well be imposing our own value system on her. We cannot assume the same thing
when a small child or an ape smokes, as they lack the capacities to know the
possible consequences of what they are doing for other ends they care about (feeling
well, doing things which require good health). We may, consequently, have reason
to treat adults and human children and animals in different ways (e.g., to ask
informed consent for medical procedures or interventions of adult human beings,
but not of small children), but the point I wanted to make here is that there seems to
be no reason to think that their suffering or pursuit of ends of their desires is not as
morally relevant as ours.
We, then, have certain duties to animals if they desire and purposively pursue
certain objects or states of affairs (e.g., to avoid suffering). Such capacities are much
less complex than those involved in moral and prudential agency. The latter, more
sophisticated kinds of agency seem to require the capacity for second-order thought:
thinking about one’s desires and (instrumental) beliefs, and the ability to construct
valid arguments from such desires and beliefs to action plans. It seems that a being
must possess language to be able to have such capacities (Bermudez 2007:131).
This, however, does not seem to be necessary in order to be an agent in the less
demanding sense of purposefully pursuing objects of desires. Bermudez argues we
have reason to use psychological explanations for the behavior of animals if this is
not an inflexible response to a stimulus (2007:129). Such explanations are
applicable if there is an instrumental component in the psychological states of the
animal (which include a desire, such as the desire to eat) that give rise to actions.
Such an instrumental component can have the form of a belief (a nonlinguistic
analogue to ‘‘the food is in the tube’’) or an immediate perception (that the food is in
the tube). There are sources that seem to support that certain species of fish show
behavior that is flexible and seems to involve such instrumental components (e.g.,
Kuba 2010; Laland 2003), but of course much more research is needed by biologists
to determine whether this is the case and for which species of fish, and philosophers
of mind can help interpret the meaning of such behaviors (see part I in this special
issue for relevant discussions).
Implications
In the introduction to this paper, I pointed out some differences between
utilitarianism, in which the morally right thing to do is what maximizes the
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welfare of everyone taken together, and Kantian theory. I have now argued that
animal welfare can be directly and in itself morally relevant in Kantian theory. This
might be thought surprising. Aren’t the implications of these Kantian arguments
close to utilitarianism? I have argued that it follows from these Kantian arguments
that moral agents have to regard, for example, a principle of harming others for the
sake of self-interest as morally unacceptable as such. In utilitarian theory, if animal
interests are weighed equally to human interests, it can in certain cases be justified
to harm animals for the sake of self-interest: when our combined interests in doing
so outweigh the suffering of the animals involved. If duties to animals indeed follow
from these Kantian arguments, though, harming animals for the sake of self-interest
would be morally impermissible. This would in most cases make the use of sentient,
desiring animals for the sake of food production morally problematic.
Conclusion
Only those who have the capacities required to be a moral agent are morally
responsible. Nonrational animals do not have to accept formal rational requirements
as they cannot understand such requirements (this is known as the principle ‘‘ought
implies can’’). It could still be, in Kantian practical reasoning theories, that we have
to accept moral requirements that involve treating animals in a certain way, such as
not harming them. Since the reason why we cannot accept a universal principle of
harming others when this in our self-interest is based on e.g., our not wanting to
suffer or needing certain basic goods in order to be able to successfully pursue any
end we desire to fulfill, it seems to be arbitrary to exclude nonrational animals who
also have such desires from the scope of these duties. If fish have such desires, we
also have these duties to them.
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